The jury is still out on whether or not Mahmoud Ahmadinejad really won the election and, if so, to what extent. How this will play out is also anybody’s guess. One thing I already find worrying, however, is Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric, which talks about freedom and bipartisanship, on one hand, and delegitimizes legitimate political opposition, on the other. The following combination of quotes from today’s Washington Post is chilling:

This election was so free that you could say it was complete freedom. . . . The election is gone and done. It is time for friendship, coalition and building the country. . . . [Reporters should talk to] true Iranians . . . Like the people you meet at my rallies. . . . [As for the opposition,] There is no other choice than to surrender. . . You think you are of the elite? That you are above the people? . . . The society must be purified of these people. . . . They will try to stop me, but I will expose them to the great nation of Iran.

The first statement rings hollow. What is “complete freedom,” especially in the Iranian system where unelected religious leaders determines who may run for office? The second statement sounds eminently reasonable, something like a well-wishing plea for bipartisanship in the United States. Then things get spooky. It is one thing to demonize the other side as not truly patriotic. We experienced that last fall with Sarah Palin’s rhetoric of “real America,” the “media elite,” and so on. While I find such rhetoric reprehensible, at least it did not come right out and say that the other side had no right to exist. It understood the concept of a loyal opposition, even if that opposition supposedly loves America less than Palin’s and McCain’s supporters do.

If Ahmadinejad’s legitimately won the election, which is far from clear, his rhetoric shows that he has no respect for democratic processes. Elections without the concept of a loyal opposition are meaningless. Here’s hoping that Iran’s Supreme Leader gets that.

Perhaps it will. After all, the oppositional candidate, Mir Hossein Mousavi, was screened and approved by religious authorities. We are talking about opposition that is legitimate within the narrow confines of Iran’s political system, not our own. If even that is not acceptable, then what will be left of Iran’s revolution? Iranian independence, to be sure, as well as clerical rule and possibly the more extensive subjugation of women, but what about the semi-democratic elements of its constitution? The campaign, polling, and post-election protests suggest that they matter to Iranians. And well they should. The legitimacy of Iran’s post-1979 system depends on them.