


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 Yes, although airpower did not win the war, its broad effectiveness made it a decisive factor in the outcome of World War II. (*Conrad C. Crane*) 1

 No, airpower was an important adjunct to the Allied war effort, but it was not decisive in defeating the Axis powers. (*Michael Perry May*) 3

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 Montgomery's single-thrust approach offered the best possibility of defeating the Germans, but this strategy was undercut by his personality, the failure of Operation Market Garden, and the slow advances of British ground forces. (*John F. Votaw*) 22

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 Yes, the grand coalition of the Allied powers was doomed to collapse after World War II because it was built only on the common interest of defeating the Axis; mutual mistrust and postwar self-interest caused the Cold War. (*Grant Weller*) 28

 No, the collapse of the grand coalition was not foreordained; it was caused by the United States breaking from its pattern of traditional isolationism after the war and the Soviet policy of territorial expansion, among other factors. (*Frederick W. Kagan*) 31

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 Yes, the Allies genuinely differed on war plans, as Britain was determined to preserve its global status while attacking German-held territory along the periphery, while the United States desired a more direct and speedy resolution of the European conflict. (*Frederick W. Kagan*) 35

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Yes, the U.S. atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were justified because the Japanese were determined to defend their homeland to the last man in order to raise the human cost for Allied victory and induce a negotiated peace. (*Michael Perry May*) 49

No, although the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was justified and morally defensible, the attack on Nagasaki was, in its haste, a morally indefensible result of bureaucratic ineptitude. (*William J. Astore*) 52

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Yes, the Allies should have bombed the death camps and more aggressively opposed the Holocaust in order to save lives and send a message of condemnation to the Nazis. (*William R. Forstchen*) 57

No, Allied bombing raids on the death camps would have been difficult without inflicting heavy losses on the inmates and would have slowed the war effort by diverting airplanes needed for military targets. (*Dennis Showalter*) 59

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An invasion of the Balkans by the Western Allies would not have prevented Soviet domination of the area after World War II. (*Gordon W. Rudd*) 71

If the Western Allies had invaded the Balkans, the war would have ended sooner and much of Eastern Europe would not have fallen under Soviet domination. (*Brian R. Sullivan*) 74

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No, the Holocaust was not unlike other attempts at racial genocide; in the past century more than 120 million people have been annihilated under similar circumstances. (*Edward B. Westermann*) 163

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Yes, although the British and French saw World War II as the beginning of the end for their empires, they marshaled all their colonial resources to defeat the Axis. (*Deborah A. Shackleton*) 169

No, the British and French hoped to retain, if not reform, their colonial systems after World War II. (*Dennis Showalter*) 171

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Italian strategic blunders, poor training, inadequate equipment, and military defeats greatly harmed the Axis war effort. (*William J. Astore*) 179

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a new, unrestrained arms race; forestall future conflict; and
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reduction of their naval forces. *(Kathleen Broome Williams)* 202

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building a superior navy, but the compliance of Western allies
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No, the Nuremberg Trials were the victor's justice, complete with
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Soviet military leadership had been gutted; the Red Army was
stunned by its losses in Finland; the Wehrmacht was at its zenith;
and Joseph Stalin continued to believe in the Russo-German
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Yes, the invasion of southern France was important for obtaining
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No, although Operation Dragoon was militarily a triumph and
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No, although resistance and partisan movements did help boost national pride and distract enemy troops, they were not decisive in bringing about the defeat of Nazi Germany. *(William H. Kautt)* 246

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Yes, Franklin D. Roosevelt was an astute and effective war leader, who picked excellent military subordinates, prepared the United States for war, and helped orchestrate an effective grand strategy and maintained close ties to Britain. *(William J. Astore)*. . . 250

No, Franklin D. Roosevelt was not a great war leader because he too easily followed the British lead, favored the Navy over the Army, and let his personal feelings interfere with policy, especially with regard to General Douglas MacArthur. *(John Wheatley)* 252

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No, submarines absorbed more resources and suffered greater losses in World War II than their combat successes justified. *(Sarandis Papadopoulos)*. 259

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No, the Tokyo Trials were essentially without legal validity; they were conducted as retribution against the Japanese for initiating the war. *(John M. Jennings)*. 267

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No, unconditional surrender was not a wise policy, especially in relation to the defeat of Japan, but Harry S Truman's desire to follow Franklin D. Roosevelt's course, the availability of the atomic bomb, and the need to placate American feelings forced Truman to seek total defeat of the enemy. *(Gian P. Gentile)* 274

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Yes, U.S. Marine strategy in the central Pacific kept the Japanese off balance and effectively isolated island defenders during the American advance toward Japan. (<i>Dennis Showalter</i>).	296
No, resources given to the island-hopping campaign could have been better spent supporting the U.S. Army’s advance through the Philippines, the D-Day invasion of Normandy, and a submarine blockade of Japan. (<i>William R. Forstchen</i>).	299
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No, the Yalta agreement was a compromise designed to continue cooperation among the Allies and to prevent them from turning their armies on each other after defeating Germany. (<i>Greta Bucher</i>).	313
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